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Truth: Some preliminary considerations∗
Andrea Bianchi
Among the many things I have learned from Ernesto Napoli over about
twenty years of intense intellectual exchange with him, one is certainly
that reference, conceived as a direct, conventional, relation which most
single words (not only proper names but also common nouns, verbs, and
adjectives) have with certain worldly entities (for this construal of refer-
ence, see especially Napoli 1995), is central to the explanation of many
linguistic phenomena and properties. One of the latter, no doubt philo-
sophically interesting, is truth. Indeed, Ernesto never tired of claiming
that it is not that reference depends on truth, as in the course of the twen-
tieth century many philosophers of diﬀerent tendencies (e.g., Quineans,
Davidsonians, and arguably at least some Fregeans) have contended. On
the contrary, it is truth that depends, in a way that obviously needs to be
∗ An ancestor of this paper was presented at a workshop on truth held in Padova
in January 2015. I am grateful to Pierdaniele Giaretta for the invitation, and to
all those who gave me feedback on that occasion. Special thanks are due to Joseph
Almog, Antonio Capuano, Paolo Leonardi, Vittorio Morato, Roberto Pinzani, and
Giuseppe Spolaore for their comments on a more recent written version. Contrary
to what I usually do, in order to keep the secret about this volume, this time I did
not send the paper to Ernesto Napoli, hence I did not receive comments from him.
This might at least partly explain its being of even lower quality than usual. But I
want to thank Ernesto anyway, for all that I have learned from him in hundreds of
hours spent doing philosophy in the (tremendously cold!) kitchen of his apartment
in Padova, and later on over the phone. Without those hours, this paper could not
exist.
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speciﬁed, on reference.1 Unfortunately (but perhaps wisely, for reasons
that will become clear at the end of this paper), Ernesto did not develop
this claim into a theory of truth. In what follows, I aim to make some
preliminary, and not especially original, considerations looking ahead to
such a theory, and to show why it is so diﬃcult to complete the task.
As a starting point for my considerations, I shall use two simple, per-
haps even trivial, observations. The ﬁrst comes from J.L. Austin, who,
in a footnote to his famous article on truth, blames “‘coherence’ (and
pragmatist) theories of truth” for failing to appreciate “the trite but
central point that truth is a matter of the relation between words and
world” (1950: 130n). The second is what, in his weighty investigation on
truth, Wolfgang Ku¨nne calls a truism that philosophers have often taken
as “a preparatory step on their way towards more demanding accounts
of truth” (2003: 334). As Ku¨nne writes, in fact, “[a]ll philosophers . . .
would most cordially agree that what you say or think is true if and
only if things are as you say or think they are” (ibid.). I’m not com-
pletely certain that all philosophers would really cordially agree on this
– what about sympathizers with the coherence or pragmatist theories
mentioned by Austin? – but Austin’s and Ku¨nne’s simple observations
seem to me to be two ﬁrm standpoints. The challenge, then, is to make
a theory out of them. Unfortunately, it is not an easy challenge, and all
the attempts that have been made in this direction are, for one reason or
another, unconvincing. Elsewhere I have criticized, for example, Ku¨nne’s
articulation of his truism into what he has called the Modest Account of
truth – in symbolic notation, “∀x(x is true ↔ ∃p(x = [p] ∧ p))”, with
the non-standard existential quantiﬁcation into sentence position being
objectual over propositions and the square brackets forming, “from a
sentence which expresses a particular proposition, a singular term which
designates that proposition” (2003: 337).2 And correspondence theories,
1 In Ernesto’s writings, this issue pops up in various places, but only in scattered
remarks concerning semantics, e.g. as the claim that reference precedes and is at the
basis of evaluation (Napoli 1995: 326, 334; Leonardi and Napoli 1995: 256; Bianchi
and Napoli 2004: 175, 179–181, 202 n. 15, 222–224). My focus in this paper will be
on the metaphysical side of the issue (which is touched upon in Napoli 2010: 295–
299). For elaboration on the semantic aspect, see Joseph Almog’s contribution to this
volume.
2 See Bianchi 2010. In particular, I expressed perplexities concerning the appeal to
propositions in the account and the (consequential?) ‘obliteration’ of reference from
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towards which, although with some reservations, Austin was leaning,
face well-known problems. What are the entities that would correspond
to true (but not to false) truth(-value) bearers? Appealing to facts, as
many did in the twentieth century, under the inﬂuence of G.E. Moore
and Bertrand Russell, seems to me to lead to pseudo-explanations only,
as facts appear to be no more and no less than shadows of true truth(-
value) bearers. As W.V. Quine famously wrote, if we say that “a sentence
is true if it reports a fact”,
we have fabricated substance for an empty doctrine. The world is full of things,
variously related, but what, in addition to all that, are facts? They are projected
from true sentences for the sake of correspondence. (1987: 213)
Donald Davidson has put the objection in the following way:
Truth as correspondence with reality may be an idea we are better oﬀ without
. . . . The formulation is not so much wrong as empty . . . . The trouble lies in the
claim that the formula has explanatory power. The notion of correspondence
would be a help if we were able [to] say, in an instructive way, which fact or
slice of reality it is that makes a particular sentence true. No one has succeeded
in doing this. If we ask, for example, what makes the sentence “The moon is
a quarter of a million miles away” true, the only answer we come up with is
that it is the fact that the moon is a quarter of a million miles away . . . . [W]e
must, I think, accept the conclusion: there are no interesting and appropriate
entities available which, by being somehow related to sentences, can explain
why the true ones are true and the others not. (2000: 5-6)
Thus, Davidson concludes, “correspondence theories are without explana-
tory content” (2000: 8; for some converging considerations, see Straw-
son 1950). I agree.3 But then, what kind of theory should Austin’s and
Ku¨nne’s simple observations incline us to accept?
it. I shall return to both issues here. See, however, Ku¨nne 2010: 89–98 for a reply
(focused on the ﬁrst perplexity more than on the second).
3 Ernesto agrees too (see Bianchi and Napoli 2004: 189–191). I should note here
that some might classify even the theory I shall look ahead to as a correspondence
theory. Ku¨nne probably would, Michael Devitt certainly does (see footnote 7 below).
See also Glanzberg 2014: secs. 3.1 and 3.2, and David 2015: sec. 7.2. Although there
is perhaps a vague sense according to which such a theory may be said to take
true truth(-value) bearers to correspond to reality, I believe that this classiﬁcation
is seriously misleading, insofar as it suggests that the theory claims that there are
entities to which true, but not false, truth(-value) bearers correspond. For the same
reason, I would resist the classiﬁcation of the theory among realist ones, if realism
about truth consists in holding that “truth involves an appropriate relation between
“AAAroot” — 2016/3/29 — 8:27 — page 198 — #203
198 Andrea Bianchi
Before moving on, some clariﬁcation is needed. Unfortunately, “theory
of truth” is an expression that has been used to cover very diﬀerent
“projects”, as Richard Kirkham (1992: ch. 1) has convincingly argued.
Thus, to avoid misunderstanding, it is important that I make clear what
I take a theory of truth to be. First of all, I do not take it to be a
theory about the uses or even the semantic properties of the English
noun “truth” and adjective “true”, although it may have some indirect
bearing on them as well (especially, with regard to the semantics of
certain predicative uses of the adjective). Secondly, I do not take it to
be an analysis of the concept of truth, or anything that can be gotten
through linguistic understanding or any other a priori activity.4 Rather,
I take it to be an empirical investigation into the nature of a property.5
Certain entities – we shall discuss in a moment which ones – have the
property of being true, and the aim of a theory of truth in this sense
is to establish, in general, what it is for them to have it, and in virtue
of what they do have it. Thus, in a nutshell, the theory must take the
following form:
(1) ∀x(x is true ↔ Px),
with “x” ranging over truth(-value) bearers and “P” being a signpost for
a compound predicate whose non-logical constituents express properties
a truthbearer and some portion(s) or aspect(s) of reality” (Burgess and Burgess 2011:
68). It would be far better, in my opinion, to call it a representational theory of truth,
as Michael Lynch (2009: 22–35; 2014: 8–13) does with regard to similar ones (which
he criticizes).
4 As for the concept of truth, as opposed to the property of being true (see immedi-
ately below), my own view is that, like any other lexical concept, it is atomic, hence
not susceptible to any analysis. See Bianchi 2005 for a defense of this view, and
Bianchi 2011 for some reﬂections on its consequences on how we should conceive of
philosophical theorizing
5 The assumption that truth is a property and that (as such, I am tempted to say) it
has a nature seems to be quite natural, and so a good starting point, but it is by no
means unchallenged. That truth is a property has been denied for example by P.F.
Strawson (“Truth is not a property of symbols; for it is not a property” (1949: 84)),
while more recently Paul Horwich (1998: 1–2, 5, 37–40, 141–144) has advanced the
startling claim that truth is a property with no “underlying nature”. I shall not take
issue with them here, but let me note that Strawson himself changed his mind on
this and came to recognize that truth is a “genuine property” after all (see Ku¨nne
2003: 62–63). For some interesting considerations on these matters, see Devitt 2001.
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and relations that are more basic than truth, and by which truth can be
explained.6 If truth is a relational property, as it is natural to believe (“It
takes two to make a truth”, says another of Austin’s telling footnoted
remarks (1950: 124 n. 1)), it should be expected that at least one of these
constituents be a relational symbol. In order for the theory to count as
an account of the nature of truth, it has to be necessarily (although not,
as I have just said, a priori) true. Only in this case, in fact, could we say
that being P is, or constitutes, being true. What is important to notice
in this context is that, contrary to what Alfred Tarski (1933: 153) did
and notwithstanding my sympathies for his physicalist scruples, I am
not requiring that no unreduced semantic expression should occur in the
compound predicate by which truth is explained. Indeed, as I wrote a
moment ago, I aim to develop Ernesto’s (and others’, of course) claim
that truth depends on reference, and any theory developing this claim
will have to use the semantic verb “refer”, or some equivalent of it. There
can be no objection to this, provided only that there is a relation called
“reference” and that this relation is more basic than truth, at least in
the sense that the explanation of it does not appeal to truth. This is so
if reference either is primitive or can be explained in other terms (e.g.,
in causal or historical ones). For obvious reasons, philosophers who have
naturalistic inclinations will favour the second option (see Bianchi 2015:
95), as I do, but this is beside the point here: in both cases, in oﬀering a
theory of truth one is allowed to appeal to reference and does not need
to explain it (in the same way as, say, in oﬀering a theory of water one
is allowed to appeal to oxygen and does not need to explain it).7
6 For similar considerations with regard to theories of reference, see Bianchi 2015:
93–95.
7 See Field 1972 for criticism of Tarski on this point. The claim that reference is
“the basic semantic relation” is advanced, for example, in Leonardi and Napoli 1995:
264. In recent years, the need to appeal to reference to account for truth has been
highlighted, among others, by Devitt (1997: ch. 3; 2001) and Hilary Putnam (2015).
Devitt, for example, writes: “A correspondence theory of the sort I am proposing
explains what it is for a sentence to be true in terms of its syntactic structure and
referential relations – which each require in turn substantial theories – and, of course,
the way the world is” (2001: 168 n. 17). As will become clear later, except for the
qualiﬁcation of the theory as a correspondence theory (about which, see footnote
3 above), I am in broad agreement with this, and I am sure that Ernesto is too.
Unfortunately, however, Devitt did not oﬀer any such theory.
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Well, then, what is truth? Or, better, given what we have just said:
What is it for certain entities to be true, and in virtue of what are they
so?
In order to answer these questions and hence to reach a theory of
truth by ﬁnding something to take the place of “P” in (1), it seems to
me all important to be clear about the issue of the truth(-value) bearers:
if we want to say what kind of property truth is, we had better say what
kind of entity may have it.
In the passages by Quine and Davidson I have quoted above, truth is
ascribed to sentences. This is hardly surprising: we are certainly all used
to saying that some sentences are true and some others are false. However,
in recent times a diﬀerent view has become more and more popular
among philosophers. According to this view, which has a long history, it
is certain abstract and non-linguistic entities, propositions, that are the
truth(-value) bearers, and as a consequence it is propositional truth that
needs to be explained in some way. As we saw, this is, for example, what
Ku¨nne does with his Modest Account.8 But he is undoubtedly in good
company.9
Now, to consider truth as a property of propositions seems to me to
dangerously lose sight of the two simple observations by Austin (who, in-
deed, didn’t consider truth as a property of propositions) and by Ku¨nne
(who, on the contrary, has proposed a perplexing ‘propositionalist’ artic-
ulation of his truism). The “central point” is that “truth is a matter of
the relation between words and world”, says Austin. And even Ku¨nne’s
truism appeals to language, albeit more indirectly, since it ascribes a
truth-value to what one says, and to say something we do need words.
But where do words end up, in Ku¨nne’s Modest Account or in any other
theory of truth that takes propositions to be the truth(-value) bearers?
There is, of course, an answer that propositionalists can give to this
question. We are not denying, they can say, that certain linguistic expres-
8 See Ku¨nne 2003: 249–269 for his defense of the claim that propositions are the
primary truth(-value) bearers. The ﬁrst of the two perplexities I mentioned in footnote
4 concerned precisely this (Bianchi 2010: 66–71). See Ku¨nne 2010: 89–95 for a reply.
9 Just to give only a few almost randomly chosen examples, see Strawson 1950: 147–
149, and 1964: 166–170; Horwich 1998: 16–17, 86–103, 129–135; Soames 1999: 18–19;
Lewis 2001: 276. Even a ﬁrst, and otherwise excellent, introduction to the theories
of truth such as Volpe 2012 takes this view almost for granted, without seriously
considering any alternative (see pp. 13–19).
“AAAroot” — 2016/3/29 — 8:27 — page 201 — #206
Truth: Some preliminary considerations 201
sions, sentences, are true, or false. But everyone should agree that they
are true, or false, only derivatively. In fact, they are true, or false, only
because they have certain semantic properties, namely only because, rel-
ative to a context, they express a proposition. Moreover, they are true,
or false, only insofar as they express true, or false, propositions. It is
propositions, then, that are the primary truth(-value) bearers. A nice
dividend of this way of putting things, which is ubiquitous in the litera-
ture,10 is a useful division of labor. A theory of meaning will account for
the linguistic expressions’ semantic properties, telling us which proposi-
tion a sentence expresses relative to a context. In contrast, a theory of
truth will tell us what it is for a proposition to be true. By combining
the two theories, the propositionalists can conclude, we get a theory of
truth for sentences, thus vindicating, so to speak, Austin’s and Ku¨nne’s
simple observations.
Everything all right, then? Not exactly. This line of reasoning could
work, perhaps, if it were true that an account of the linguistic expressions’
semantic properties will lead us to identify certain abstract objects – the
propositions – as what is expressed by sentences relative to contexts.
Only in this case, in fact, would we really have some candidates other
than sentences for the role of truth(-value) bearers. But that an account
of the linguistic expressions’ semantic properties will lead us to this, is,
in my opinion, quite dubious, and certainly cannot be taken for granted.
As a matter of fact, I ﬁnd the insistent appeal to propositions that
is fashionable nowadays among analytic philosophers extremely perplex-
ing. Not, I hasten to add, because I endorse a more or less Quinean
form of semantic skepticism. On the contrary, I take it for granted that
linguistic expressions have semantic properties, and that their semantic
properties induce a partition of sentences, or of sentence/context pairs,
10 This is, for example, Scott Soames’ version: “In addition to propositions, utterances,
eternal sentences, and occasion sentences taken in contexts (sentence/context pairs)
can all be construed as truth bearers. However, the truth of a sentence or utterance
depends on the truth of the proposition it expresses. A sentence or utterance cannot
be true if it says nothing or expresses no proposition. Rather, it is true because it
expresses a true proposition” (1999: 18). And this is David Lewis’: “I take our topic to
be, in the ﬁrst instance, the truth of propositions. Sentences, or sentences in context,
or particular assertions of sentences, or thoughts, can derivatively be called true;
but only when they succeed in expressing determinate (or near enough determinate)
propositions” (Lewis 2001: 276).
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into equivalence classes.11 Perhaps, to simplify matters, one may even go
so far as to call these classes “propositions”.12 But if this were all that
propositions boil down to, then obviously their elements rather than they
themselves ought to be conceived as the primary truth(-value) bearers
(as the quotation from John Perry in the last footnote suggests).
Actually, there are two kinds of arguments that are appealed to by
those who claim that propositions are something more robust than sug-
gested above. The most common one consists in individuating some the-
oretical roles (for example, being the semantic value of a sentence rel-
ative to a context, being the object, or the content, of a propositional
attitude, being the referent of a that-clause, and, of course, being the
primary truth(-value) bearer) and calling the entities that play these
roles, whatever they are, “propositions”. Such an argument has always
seemed to me quite weak. Although this is not the place to go into this,
the theoretical roles that are usually called upon seem to me either ill-
deﬁned – are we sure that the that-clauses are referential expressions?13
– or incompatible with each other – no kind of entity can play all of them.
A perhaps less common, but in my opinion more interesting, argument
consists in highlighting how pervasive our pre-philosophical commitment
to propositions is. As Ku¨nne put it, “[t]hose who are keen to ban talk
of propositions often seem not to realize how many general terms which
are common coin in non-philosophical discourse do ‘specialized’ duty for
11 Interestingly, this way of seeing things is adumbrated by Quine himself. In 1948 he
wrote: “The useful ways in which people ordinarily talk or seem to talk about mean-
ings boil down to two. The having of meanings, which is signiﬁcance, and sameness
of meaning, or synonymy . . . . The problem of explaining these adjectives ‘signiﬁcant’
and ‘synonymous’ with some degree of clarity and rigor – preferably, as I see it, in
terms of behavior – is as diﬃcult as it is important. But the explanatory value of
special and irreducible intermediary entities called meanings is surely illusory” (1948:
11–12). With a more skeptical ring, the point is repeated much later: “The doctrine
of propositions seems in a way futile on the face of it, even if we imagine the individ-
uation problem solved. For, that solution would consist in some suitable deﬁnition of
equivalence of sentences; why not then just talk of sentences and equivalence and let
the propositions go?” (1970: 10).
12 More or less in this spirit, I believe, John Perry has contended that propositions
are “abstract objects that we use to classify states and events by the requirements
their truth (or some other form of success) impose on the rest of the world”; as such,
they “are a bit analogous to weights and lengths” (2001: 20–21).
13 For my negative answer to this question, see Bianchi 2010: 67–69.
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‘proposition’” (2003: 252). Ku¨nne’s list includes verbal nouns such as “al-
legation”, “belief”, “conjecture”, “contention”, “judgement”, “report”,
“statement”, “supposition”, and “thought”, all of which “have readings
under which they are used to refer to propositions”, as well as non-verbal
nouns such as “axiom”, “dogma”, “tenet”, “theorem”, and “thesis” (pp.
249–252). The point is certainly well taken: what else could phrases such
as “Goldbach’s conjecture” or “Pythagoras’ theorem” single out, if not
abstract entities that may be expressed by diﬀerent sentences belonging
to diﬀerent languages? I must admit that I do not have an answer, but
in any case this does not seem to me to be a suﬃcient reason for con-
sidering propositions as the primary truth(-value) bearers (cf. Bianchi
2010: 70).
This said, I know by experience that it is very diﬃcult to induce
a propositionalist to doubt the existence of propositions, and I shall
not even try here. I would like, however, to suggest the adoption of a
diﬀerent starting point for the elaboration of a theory of truth, a starting
point nearer, so to speak, to Austin’s and Ku¨nne’s simple observations.
Since, as we saw, the propositionalists, too, are ready to acknowledge
that certain linguistic expressions, sentences, can be said to be true, or
false, as well, why not attempt to develop a theory that takes sentences
themselves as truth(-value) bearers? If this will then force us to appeal
somehow to propositions, so much the worse (and so much the better for
the propositionalist).
There are at least three types of objections that can be moved against
such an approach. The ﬁrst is tied to considerations we have already
encountered. Sentences, we saw, can be said to be true, or false, only
in virtue of the fact that they have semantic properties. But then, it
could be claimed, it is not sentences, but their semantic properties (or
better, for the propositionalist, the propositions that the latter determine
relative to a context) that are properly true, or false. This is, however,
clearly a non sequitur.14 Compare: Ernesto is a voter in Italy only in
virtue of the fact that he is an Italian citizen, that is to say, for an
14 Alas, Ernesto as well seems to have fallen prey to it. He wrote: “If sentences are
true or false in virtue of what they say, it does not take much to think that it is not
the sentence but what the sentence says to be true or false; if you prefer, it does not
take much to think that the sentence’s truth or falsity is none other than the truth
or the falsity of what the sentence says” (Napoli 2010: 295, translation mine).
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objectiﬁer, only in virtue of the fact that he possesses the thing that we
call “Italian citizenship”. Nonetheless, the voter is Ernesto, not his civil
properties (his being an Italian citizen), or, worse, that strange abstract
object his Italian citizenship would be.
A second objection that is very often raised (see for example the
passages quoted in footnote 10) against the idea that sentences are the
primary truth(-value) bearers is that sentences are not true, or false, ab-
solutely, but only relatively. Indeed, they are true, or false, only relative
to a language, and/or an interpretation, and/or a context, and/or what
have you. There are, however, at least two replies that can be given to
this objection. On the one hand, that something has a property only rel-
ative to something else implies neither that it does not have the property
nor that something else (say, an abstract object) has that same property
absolutely rather than relatively (as is the case, according to the proposi-
tionalist, with propositions in relation to truth). On the other hand, and
this is what I want to stress here, it is not at all clear that the linguistic
expressions of which we can predicate truth, or falsity, are true, or false,
only relatively. In fact, the objection depends on considering linguistic
expressions in abstract, as types, that can be used in various contexts and
with varying interpretations and whose tokens can even belong to diﬀer-
ent languages. But it is not mandatory for someone aiming at developing
Austin’s and Ku¨nne’s simple observations into a theory of truth to look
at linguistic expressions from this perspective. On the contrary, what I
would like to suggest is that we should develop a theory of truth that
takes as truth(-value) bearers a subclass – the subclass of sentence tokens
– of what I like to call “linguistic particulars” (see Bianchi 2015): phys-
ical entities of some type (usually, sounds or marks) that are produced
by someone at some particular time, usually to communicate something
to someone else. Similarly, Austin takes as the truth(-value) bearer the
statement, namely “the words or sentence as used by a certain person on
a certain occasion” (1950: 119). Indeed, he takes care to specify that the
making of a statement is “an historic event, the utterance by a certain
speaker or writer of certain words (a sentence) to an audience with refer-
ence to an historic situation, event or what not” (119–120).15 It seems to
15 There is actually some ambiguity in Austin’s way of phrasing his point, so that it
is not completely clear whether he takes statements to be acts or the ‘products’ of
acts of a certain kind. By “linguistic particulars” I mean the latter.
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me that to consider those linguistic particulars that are sentence tokens,
or what Austin calls “statements”, as the (primary) truth(-value) bear-
ers is quite reasonable. On the one side, it is commonsensical (think once
again of Austin’s and Ku¨nne’s simple observations);16 on the other, it
does not appeal to entities that are ontologically dubious. And, to come
back to the objection we were discussing, we can say of a sentence token,
or of a statement in Austin’s sense, that it is true, or false, absolutely, not
only relative to something else (a language, an interpretation, a context,
or what have you), although it is still true that it is true, or false, only
in virtue of its semantic properties.
But haven’t I been too hasty in arriving at this conclusion? Ku¨nne
gives us some grounds to think so:
Suppose a speaker is talking on the phone to his worst enemy while looking at
his best friend: in a single utterance of ‘You are my best friend’ he might address
both persons simultaneously and thus express two propositions . . . with diﬀer-
ent truth-values. Surely confusion would result if we were to call the utterance
(or the token) true and not true. Or suppose you utter a grammatically and/or
lexically ambiguous sentence, intending your utterance to be understood both
ways. (Perhaps you are making a joke, and the point of the joke depends on the
sentence being given both readings by the person you are addressing.) Then
it may very well be the case that you express a truth and a falsehood at one
stroke. Again, confusion would result if we were to call the utterance (or the
token-sentence) true and not true. (Ku¨nne 2003: 266–267)
Let me round this oﬀ by adding an interlingual example . . . . Annabella, a busi-
ness woman in Milan, has two telephones on her desk . . . . An American col-
league and a British friend rang her simultaneously wanting to know how much
16 Or at least I ﬁnd it commonsensical. Horwich and Ku¨nne think otherwise. This is
Horwich: “I shall follow ordinary language in supposing that truth is a property of
propositions. Thus, if we agree with Oscar, we attribute truth to what he said, to the
proposition he asserted. Evidently the sentence-type of English that he used is not
true; for that very sentence-type is used on other occasions to make false statements.
Nor would one normally characterize the noises he made, or his belief state, as true”
(1998: 16). This is Ku¨nne: “In our everyday employment of ‘true’, we normally, if not
exclusively, take propositions to be the things that are susceptible of truth . . . . An
account that aims to be faithful to our workaday concept of truth cannot aﬀord to
turn its back on propositions: they are the primary truth-value bearers . . . . But don’t
we ascribe truth (without relativization) to utterances in our daily transactions? I
don’t think we do” (2003: 263–264). However, as a teacher I know by experience how
diﬃcult it is for a (philosophy!) student to even entertain the thought that there are
abstract entities that are the content of our mental acts and states, what is expressed
by sentences in context, and what truth and falsity are properties of.
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proﬁt her ﬁrm made last year. She wanted only her friend to know the truth.
So picking up both receivers she said, ‘One billion lira. But excuse me, I have
a visitor in my oﬃce. Let’s talk tomorrow.’ And then she hung up. Annabella
intended her American colleague to understand that the proﬁt amounted to
109 lira, and her British friend to understand that it amounted to 1012 lira. A
falsehood as well as a truth were conveyed by just one utterance . . . . Therefore,
if utterances . . . were themselves truth-value bearers, some bearers would be
both true and not true. All this is certainly unbearable. (268)
What these, admittedly ingenious but undoubtedly far-fetched, cases
might suggest is that sentence tokens are true (at most) only relative to
a context (“You are my best friend”), an interpretation (the ambiguous
sentence), or a language (the “one billion lira” example). However, it
seems to me that there are good reasons to resist this conclusion, which
depends on a bad understanding of what a sentence token is.17 Linguis-
tic particulars are not mere sounds or marks, to which an interpretation
needs to be somehow attached. On the contrary, they have their se-
mantic properties absolutely, so to speak: their origin – the history of
their production – makes them have them (see Bianchi 2015: 100–103
for a development of this point in relation to referring linguistic partic-
ulars). From an epistemological point of view their semantic properties
may sometimes be diﬃcult to discern, and this is a fact that the speak-
ers exploit in Ku¨nne’s cases, but they are metaphysically determinate
nonetheless. Consider the “one billion lira” case, for example. Either on
that occasion Annabella is speaking British English, in which case by
producing a true sentence token she probably succeeds in leading her
American colleague to acquire a false belief, exploiting the fact that he
will probably take her to be speaking American English and as a conse-
quence misunderstand the token; or she is speaking American English,
in which case by producing a false sentence token she probably succeeds
in leading her British friend to acquire a true belief, exploiting the fact
that he will probably take her to be speaking British English and as a
consequence misunderstand the token. And which language Annabella
is speaking is perfectly determinate, by her cognitive history, although
in this case irrelevant from a practical point of view, since no matter
which language she is speaking she will probably achieve what she wants
17 Just for the record, let me register here that Kirkham (1992: 67–69) discusses an
interlingual case similar to Ku¨nne’s, but concludes that it does not force us to accept
that sentence tokens are true only relative to a language.
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to achieve, having “only her friend . . . know the truth” (but notice that
only in the second case could Annabella be charged with lying to her
American colleague). In my opinion, Ku¨nne’s other cases can be dealt
with in a similar way, mutatis mutandis.18
There remains to be considered a third objection to the claim that
sentences (or, better, given what we have just said, sentence tokens) are
the primary truth(-value) bearers.19 In fact, isn’t the claim too reduc-
tive? Even Ku¨nne’s truism may suggest that this is so, insofar as in it a
truth-value is ascribed not only to what one says, but also to what one
thinks. And in our discussion of the “one billion lira” case we talked of
acquiring a true, or a false, belief. Now, to say something we do need
words, but at least prima facie we do not need them to think or believe
something. If this were so, a theory of truth taking sentence tokens as the
truth(-value) bearers would not be able to account for certain signiﬁcant
truth-ascriptions we are all used to making. Consider, however, that we
are all trained in the linguistic game of ascribing truth and falsity in
relation to certain simple linguistic particulars (what is uttered by mom,
or suchlike). If we come to extend our ascriptions to certain mental acts
and states as well, we probably do so because they are relevantly similar
to what we have been trained to ascribe truth or falsity to. This might
seem to be grist for the propositionalists’ mill, since they may claim that
the mental acts and states at issue are similar to utterances precisely in
that like them they have a proposition as their content. It is also because
of this, they might conclude, that we need to develop a theory of truth
for propositions rather than for sentence tokens. But it can also be the
case that the points of similarity are diﬀerent. For example, it is possible
18 As Giuseppe Spolaore has pointed out to me, however, even if, in contrast to what
I have said, it were maintained that sentence tokens such as those involved in these
cases are actually equivocal, no interesting general conclusion would follow. In fact,
it would still be the case that most of the sentence tokens that we produce are not
equivocal. Hence, the resulting relativity would not pose insurmountable diﬃculties
to the claim that truth is a property primarily of sentence tokens.
19 Actually, there is a further objection that is sometimes raised against the claim.
It is diﬃcult, it is contended, to account for logical truth and logical consequence if
we take sentence tokens as the pertinent truth(-value) bearers. See Kaplan 1989: 522,
546; Kaplan 1989a: 585 n. 40, 586–587; Ku¨nne 2003: 265–266. I cannot deal with this
here, as the discussion would take us too far aﬁeld. As should be clear, my focus in
this paper is plain truth, not logical truth.
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that the mental acts and states to which we ascribe truth or falsity in-
volve vehicles that are suﬃciently similar to linguistic expressions, as the
language of thought hypothesis may suggest.20 It is also to shed light on
these issues, then, that it seems useful to me to try and develop a theory
of truth for sentence tokens. If we understand what it is for a sentence
token to be true, it is possible that we gain a better understanding of
why we ascribe truth or falsity to certain mental acts and states as well.
As for the issue of the truth(-value) bearers, I shall stop here. Now,
the really diﬃcult part. What is it for a sentence token to be true? That
is, what should we put in place of “P” in our theory of truth? Let’s go
back once again to the two simple observations that we have chosen to
use as our starting point. Austin tells us that “truth is a matter of the
relation between words and world”, while Ku¨nne appeals to how things
are. But how can we develop this generic mention of the world or of
the way in which things are into a theory without ‘fabricating’ strange
entities – facts – that would correspond to those sentence tokens that
are true? Ku¨nne gives us a little help when he writes that “what you
say or think is true if and only if things are as you say or think they
are”. When by producing a linguistic particular – a sentence token –
we make a statement, to use Austin’s terminology, we say that things
are in a certain way. And this is so because the linguistic particular we
produce represents things as being that way. What’s more, in order to
say that things are in a certain way, we have to talk about certain things.
There is no saying that without talking about. And we cannot talk about
without using linguistic particulars that refer to something. Brieﬂy, we
can say that things are in a certain way only because we can combine
in a certain way linguistic particulars that refer to certain things, so as
to obtain linguistic particulars that represent things as being that way.
(Moreover, if my speculations in the last paragraph are on the right track,
the same holds for thinking: we can think that things are in a certain
way only because we can combine in a certain way (quasi-)linguistic
particulars that refer to certain things, so as to obtain (quasi-)linguistic
particulars that represent things as being that way). Here, then, emerges
the crucial link between truth and reference, which has more than once
20 On the language of thought hypothesis, see Fodor 1975 and Field 1978. In Bianchi
2005 and 2007 I have argued for the claim that we think by means of the language
that we speak. This, obviously, would make the similarity even more marked.
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been highlighted in the course of the twentieth century (by Ernesto as
well, as I said) but which those who take truth to be a property of
propositions tend to lose sight of.21 In a nutshell, the truth-value of
a sentence token depends on the way things are with regard to those
entities that certain linguistic particulars by which it is constituted refer
to.
Let’s consider an example to clarify things. If I now say that Ernesto is
insightful, I produce a structured linguistic particular – a sentence token.
The sentence token that I produce is true, because it is constituted by
a linguistic particular (a token of the name “Ernesto”) that refers to a
speciﬁc individual and by a linguistic particular (a token of the adjective
“insightful”) that refers to a speciﬁc property, and the individual that
the ﬁrst particular refers to, Ernesto, has the property that the second
particular refers to, insightfulness.22 In this way, we have explained the
truth of a certain structured linguistic particular – a sentence token
– in terms of the reference of the linguistic particulars by which it is
constituted and the way in which things are. Moreover, we did this, so it
seems, in line with Austin’s simple observation that “truth is a matter
of the relation between words and world” and, in the end, with Ku¨nne’s
that “what you say . . . is true if and only if things are as you say . . . they
are” as well. And, last but not least, we did so without postulating the
existence of ontologically dubious entities such as propositions or facts.
Was it all so easy? Not at all, of course. We neglected a fundamental
aspect: the truth of a sentence token depends not only on the reference of
the linguistic particulars that constitute it and the way in which things
are, but also on its structure, or form. If all true sentence tokens had
the same form as the one that I produced when I said that Ernesto is
insightful, it would not be diﬃcult to oﬀer a satisfactory theory of truth.
Simplifying a bit, here it is: ∀x(x is true ↔ the individual that x’s ﬁrst
constituent refers to has the property that x’s second constituent refers
to). By such a theory, we could for example account for the truth of the
21 This was my second perplexity concerning Ku¨nne’s Modest Account (see footnote
4).
22 That adjectives (as well as verbs and common nouns) are referential expressions
and that they refer to entities other than individuals are basic tenets of Ernesto’s
philosophy of language. See for example Napoli 1995: 329; Leonardi and Napoli 1995:
263–264; Bianchi and Napoli 2004: 223–225.
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linguistic particular that I produce when I say that Paolo is generous,
of the one that I produce when I say that Diego is austere, and of the
one that I produce when I say that I am male. But obviously, as soon
as we consider the linguistic particular that I produce when I say that
Ernesto is younger than Paolo, we are in trouble. Actually, it would
not be diﬃcult to extend our theory so as to cover linguistic particulars
having the same form as this as well. But, again, it would not be diﬃcult
to then ﬁnd linguistic particulars with a diﬀerent form that put us in
trouble. And so on and so forth.23
In the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Trac-
tatus on the one hand and Tarski’s meta-mathematic work on the other
highlighted the role of form in accounting for truth.24 However, neither
of their proposals seems to me satisfactory, for diﬀerent reasons. Wittgen-
stein demanded too much of form, so to speak. In his picture theory, he
postulated the existence of non-linguistic entities (facts!) isomorphic to
certain linguistic expressions (his “elementary propositions”) to account
for the truth of the latter. Tarski, instead, in his truth deﬁnitions focused
on linguistic forms (although only in relation to certain very simple for-
mal languages) but failed to take reference seriously, as Hartry Field has
convincingly shown in his 1972 article.
It is this dependence of truth on form that makes the development
of a theory of truth a peculiarly complex, if not impossible, task: un-
fortunately, there is no compact way to characterize the dependence of
truth on reference, form and the way in which things are. There are no
shortcuts (except for recursion): as Tarski realized, we need to produce
a complete catalogue of possible sentential forms, and then to explain
how the truth of the linguistic particulars having each of these forms is
determined by the reference of their constituents and the way in which
things are. Sad to say, until we have this catalogue and all the relative
explanations, we shall not have a theory of truth. In the meantime, we
23 This is basically a version of what Ku¨nne (2003: 111) has called “the Procrustes
Problem”.
24 It can be argued that they were somehow anticipated by Aristotle, who famously
claimed that “to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false,
while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true”. According
to Davidson, in fact, “Aristotle’s characterization . . . makes clear . . . that the truth
of a sentence depends on the inner structure of the sentence, i.e., on the semantic
features of the parts” (1997: 23).
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have to content ourselves with some fragments, relative to linguistic par-
ticulars having simple sentential forms, which will at least give us an
idea of the way to go, and with a couple of simple observations (which,
unfortunately, are ways too often blatantly ignored).
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